Missile Chronology
1960 -1989
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1957-1961
North Korea's First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) includes the production of 132mm artillery rockets. [Note: The 132mm size of the artillery is unusual, but other sources substantiate it.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, Korea National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 13.
Early 1960s
North Korea begins producing a version of the Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL).
—Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 719.
December 1962
The Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party adopts a policy to strengthen the military along "four lines." The party seeks to: (1) improve political and technical discipline in the military; (2) modernize the military; (3) "arm" all the people with "class conscientiousness and military technology;" and (4) fortify the "whole country." The military modernization program is a response to the modernization program in South Korea that followed the 1961 military coup d'état. The North Korean military modernization program includes expanded missile procurement and import substitution plans for arms production in general.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 246; ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 160-161; 262-263.
Late 1962
North Korea receives a battalion of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from the USSR.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
Late 1962-Early 1963
North Korea receives a battalion of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from the USSR. The missiles are deployed near Pyongyang.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 15.
1965
The Hamhung Military Academy is established to train personnel for missile development. Kim Il Sung determines that North Korea must be able to produce missiles that can strike Japan to prevent the intervention of US and Japanese military forces in the case of another Korean war. [Note: This could mark the beginning of the North Korean missile program].
—Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsang'ŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang," ROK IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 2; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 2; Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
1965
North Korea concludes an agreement with the USSR to acquire weapon systems, including artillery rockets and transporter erector launchers (TELs). The systems are to be delivered in 1968.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 4-5.
October 1966
The Korean Workers Party holds its second conference for party leaders. Kim Il Sung emphasizes the need to develop economic and military capabilities together. Following Kim's announcement, North Korea establishes the Second Machine Industry Ministry under the party secretary in charge of military industries. The Second Machine Industry Ministry is later renamed the Second Economic Committee in 1971.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 45-46; "Minsaeng Hŭisaengwi Kunsusanŏp Pŏnch'ang," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 31 March 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Kwang In, "'Twaejigongjang' Sŏn Missile Saengsan," Chosun Ilbo, 11 February 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; "'Pyongyang Pig Factory' Produces Missiles," Chosun Ilbo, 12 February 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>.
1966-67
Kim Il Sung issues directive to develop nuclear warheads for missiles.
—Interview with North Korean defector by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 1 November 2001, Seoul.
1967
North Korea receives SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles (ASMs) from the USSR.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
1967
North Korea concludes another agreement with the USSR to acquire weapon systems, including artillery rockets and transporter erector launchers (TELs). The systems are to be delivered in 1968.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 4-5; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
1967-68
North Korea probably receives the first deliveries of SS-N-2 Styx missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 3.
1968
North Korea receives 27 to 63 FROG-5 (3R10 Luna-2) artillery rockets, 9 transporter erector launchers (TELs), and approximately 12 FROG-6 trainer vehicles from the USSR. The agreements for the delivery of this equipment were signed in 1965 and 1967.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 4-5.
18 January 1968
Thirty-one North Korean commandos secretly cross the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on a mission to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee. The commandos approach within about 800m of the presidential residence, but fail to assassinate Park. All but one of the commandos are eventually killed or commit suicide. Thirty-one South Koreans die in the fire fights, and 44 are wounded. North Korea later denies it is responsible for the attack, claiming the perpetrators are South Korean citizens rising up against the government.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 121-122; 124.
23 January 1968
North Korea captures the USS Pueblo off Wŏnsan on North Korea's east coast. North Korea claims the ship was in North Korea's territorial waters, but the United States claims it was in international waters. one American crewman dies and 82 are captured by the North Korean navy. North Korea releases the crew exactly 11 months later.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 122-146; "U.S. Warned Not to Forget Lesson from 'Pueblo' Incident," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; "Migug'ŭn <Pueblo> Hoŭi Kyohun'ŭl Itchi Mar'aya Handa/Oegug'indŭl'ŭi Panhyang," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Anti-U.S. Education Intensified in DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "Chosŏn'esŏ'ŭi Panmi'gyoyang," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.
1968-69
North Korea receives S-2 Sopka (SSC-2b Samlet) coastal-defense missiles (CDMs) from the USSR. The missiles are sufficient to outfit five batteries. The missiles are deployed on the east coast of North Korea, where they replace coastal artillery.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
1968-70
North Korea acquires FROG-5 and FROG-7 rockets from the USSR.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
15 April 1969
The North Korean air force shoots down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane in international air space over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 crewmembers.
—Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 146-148.
1969-70
China assists North Korea in the reorganization and expansion of the Soviet-built Samlet maintenance and assembly facilities. North Korea acquires and fields the Chinese-built HY-1 (a reverse-engineered Soviet SS-N-2 Styx surface-to-surface anti-ship missile [ASM]). Some HY-1 deliveries are made directly from Chinese naval stocks and some are shipped as "knock-down" kits for assembly.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
1969-70
North Korea receives FROG-3, FROG-5 and FROG-7 rockets from the USSR.
—Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 201.
Late 1960s
North Korea takes delivery of Soviet BM-21 122mm-caliber MRLs. [Note: North Korea had plans to manufacture 132mm artillery rockets in 1957 but is still buying Soviet multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) in the late 1960s.]
—Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 719.
Late 1960s
North Korea receives HQ-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs; Chinese version of Soviet SA-2) and HY-1 anti-ship missiles (ASMs) from China.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
Late 1960s
North Korea begins production of 107 mm, 132mm, and 140mm rockets and launchers. [Note: It takes North Korea about 10 years to move from planning to production.]
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247; ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 180.
Early 1970s
Soviet deliveries of SSC-2b (Samlet) anti-ship missiles (ASMs) continue. The missiles are supplied in "knock-down" kits, which the North Korean military can assemble and test after having received training from the USSR. However, the USSR refuses to supply more modern missiles due to political differences. This leads North Korea to approach China for assistance, which it receives in the form of transfers of reverse-engineered Soviet-designed missile systems and Chinese missile research and development technology.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
Early 1970s
North Korea receives assistance from China to "reorganize maintenance and assembly programs for the SA-2b SAMs, SS-N-2b (Styx) and SSC-2 (Samlet) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and FROG-5 tactical ballistic rockets, all originally provided by the former USSR."
—Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales—Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
1971
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea possesses six Komar-class and nine Osa-class missile boats armed with Styx anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
—The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1971-72 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p. 48.
September 1971
North Korea signs military agreement with China to acquire, develop, and produce modern weapons systems, including ballistic missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 3.
1972
North Korea establishes an indigenous SY-1/HY-1 production facility. However, many major components are still provided by Chinese factories.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207.
1972
North Korea begins production of SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
1972
North Korea receives 20 Scud-B missiles from the USSR. North Korea asked for Scud missiles in the mid-1960s, but the USSR refused. Following the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, North Korea offered to grant Soviet analysts and technicians access to the equipment onb oard in exchange for the right to purchase Scud-B missiles. Soviet technicians spent about six months analyzing the equipment from the Pueblo before negotiations on the missile sales began. After receiving the Scud-Bs, North Korean engineers spent one to two months taking apart one of the missiles and sketching the internal design. This delivery has not been confirmed, but this would establish an "upper bound" for the beginning of North Korea's program to reverse-engineer the Scud-B.
—Interview with North Korean defector by Daniel A. Pinkston, senior research associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1 November 2000, Seoul.
2-5 May 1972
South Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Lee Hu Rak secretly visits Pyongyang and meets with Kim Il Sung. The two men discuss the eventual unification of Korea, and Kim tells Lee to convey his apology for the attempted assassination of Park Chung Hee in January 1968, saying he was unaware of it. Kim blamed the attempt on "leftist chauvinists" who were purged following the incident.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; "South-North Joint Communiqué," 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>.
29 May- 1 June 1972
North Korean Deputy Premier Park Sŏng Ch'ŏl makes a secret visit to Seoul and meets with Park Chung Hee and South Korean Central Intelligence Director Lee Hu Rak.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; "South-North Joint Communiqué," 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/>.
4 July 1972
North and South Korea sign a joint communiqué that declares three principles for Korean unification: (1) unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference; (2) unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other; and (3) a great racial unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. The communiqué also provides for the establishment of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang to prevent the inadvertent outbreak of military conflict. [Note: Following the signing of the joint communiqué, both Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee are able to push through constitutional revisions that concentrate power in the executive branch.]
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 23-26; "South-North Joint Communiqué," 4 July 1972, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>.
1973
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea possesses 24 unguided FROG-5 and FROG-7 rockets and operates six SSC-2b sites. Furthermore, the North Korean navy reportedly has 10 Komar-class and 8 Osa-class missile boats armed with Styx anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
—The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1973-74 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p. 53.
1974
North Korea is believed to have acquired a few Soviet AT-3 Sagger ATGMs and SA-7 Grail (9K32 Strella) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from Egypt. North Korea reverse-engineered these weapon systems and deployed them by the late 1970s.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 8; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 18.
1974
North Korea acquires SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from the USSR.
—Nam Yong Chin, Hankook Ilbo, 8 February 1991, p. 8, in "DPRK's Advanced Weapons Analyzed," JPRS-TND-91-008, 31 May 1991, pp. 7-9.
1974
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea possesses 12 unguided FROG-5 and FROG-7 rockets. Furthermore, the North Korean navy reportedly has 10 Komar-class and 8 Osa-class missile boats armed with Styx anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
—The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1974-75 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p. 53.
1974-75
North Korea's HY-1 production facility is converted to produce HY-2 missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
1975
North Korea begins to produce an indigenous version of the Soviet AT-1 Snapper anti-tank guided missile (ATGM).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 8; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 18.
17 April 1975
North Korean President Kim Il Sung leads a delegation to Beijing where Defense Minister O Jin U expresses a desire to purchase tactical ballistic missiles from China. China does not have that class of missile at this time, but the North Korean query coincides with growing Chinese interest in developing such a missile. China later begins a program to development the DF-61, a liquid-propelled tactical ballistic missile (TBM). The single-stage DF-61 is to have a range of about 600km with a 1,000kg warhead, a length of nine meters, a diameter of one meter, and an inertial guidance system. North Korean engineers participate in the design of the missile for about one year before the project is cancelled in 1978.
—Hua Di, one Superpower Worse that Two," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp. 14-15; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 248-249.
1975-76
North Korea acquires "approximately 24 to 56" FROG-7B (9M21E Luna-M) artillery rockets from Egypt. Syria may have been involved in this transfer or may have separately transferred a small number of FROG-7Bs.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 6.
Mid-1970s
North Korea begins producing Soviet model BM-21 122mm-caliber multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). [Note: It takes North Korea at least five years to begin production following procurement from the USSR. See <entry for late 1960s on North Korea taking delivery of Soviet MRLs>.]
—Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 719.
Mid-1970s
North Korea acquires HJ-73 anti-tank missiles (ATMs) and HN-5A surface-to-air missiles (SAMs; Chinese version of the Soviet SA-7).
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.
Mid-1970s
North Korea begins a program to reverse-engineer FROG-7A rockets. The program is eventually cancelled when North Korea begins its Scud-B reverse-engineering program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207.
Mid-1970s
North Korea begins to acquire the HY-1 missile in both the coastal defense version (CSSC-2 Silkworm) and ship-launched version (CSS-N-2 Safflower).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 4.
1976
North Korea purchases two Scud-B missiles from Egypt. [Note: There is conflicting information on whether North Korea received its first Scud-Bs from Egypt in 1976 or later, possibly in 1979, 1980, or 1981. one North Korean defector claims that North Korea received its first Scud missiles from the USSR in 1972.]
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry Says Nodong-1 Test in May Successful," JPRS-TND-93-020, 28 June 1993, p. 1; ROK Ministry of Unification, Information Analysis Bureau, "Pukhan Missile Munjae Kwallyŏn Ch'amgojaryo," press release, 3 November 2000, p. 1; "Pukhan, Sajong 1 Ch'ŏn Kilometer Isang Missile Kaebalchung," Joongang Ilbo, 8 November 1991, <http://www.joins.com>.
1976
North Korea probably begins full-scale production of the HY-2 anti-ship missile (ASM).
—Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
18 August 1976
North Korean soldiers use axes to kill two US Army officers in the Joint Security Area at P'anmunjŏm. The confrontation between a United Nations Command (UNC) work crew and North Korean soldiers takes place as the crew is beginning to trim a tree that was blocking the view of a guard post. The tree-cutting operation is completed three days later after UNC forces go on full alert and the two sides go to the brink of war.
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.74-83; Chuck Downs, Over the Line (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 151-158.
24 November 1976
North Korea and Pakistan sign a protocol on technical cooperation.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 442.
Late 1976
China agrees to an April 1975 North Korean proposal for joint development of the DF-61 single-stage mobile tactical missile, which may carry cluster munitions or fuel-air explosive warheads. The maximum range of the missile is estimated to be 600km with a 1,000kg payload, with guidance to be supplied by a new Chinese-developed gyro.
—Hua Di, one Superpower Worse than Two," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp. 14-15; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 201.
March 1977
Korean Workers Party Secretary Kang Sŏng San attends a reception hosted by China's Seventh Machine Industry Ministry, which develops China's ballistic missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1991, pp. 404-411.
31 March 1977
A North Korean delegation that includes 27 "nuclear missile specialists" participates in a reception given by China's Seventh Machine Industry Ministry (第7機械工業省). The delegation later departs for a nuclear test site in the Xinjiang (新疆) Uighur Autonomous Region. [Note: The site is almost certainly the "Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Site"].
—"Pukkoe'sŏhaek Missile Yŏn'gu," Donga Ilbo, 9 April 1977, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.
6 July 1977
North Korea and Libya sign a cooperative agreement on science and technology.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 442.
1978
The joint Chinese-North Korean DF-61 missile project collapses when its primary Chinese supporter, Chen Xilian, is ousted from office. After the project is cancelled, North Korea turns to the USSR for technical assistance, but the Soviets deny the request. However, participation in the DF-61 project enabled North Korean personnel to gain experience with guided missile systems. [Note: While the program was never completed, North Korean technicians and scientists who worked on the project may have brought back valuable knowledge on missile design. Given that the Chinese acquired restricted missile information during training with the Soviets in the 1960s, it is plausible that North Korea might have duplicated this feat while working with the Chinese.]
—John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 248-249, 265-266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game" Shindonga, August 1999, pp. 201-202.
1979
Negotiations begin between North Korea and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for the construction of a digital bipolar integrated circuit factory in North Korea.
—Terminal Report on Project: DP/DRK/79/003; Establishment of Digital Bi-Polar Integrated Circuit Plant in DPR of Korea, (New Delhi: ET&T Development Corporation Ltd., n.d.).
1979
North Korea drafts a plan to indigenously develop a missile "similar to the DF-61."
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 248-249, 265-266.
Late 1970s
North Korea begins reverse-engineering of FROG rockets in the "January 18th Machinery Factory," an underground production facility in Kagam-ri, Kaech'on-kun, South P'yŏng'an Province. The facility may employ over 10,000 workers. [Note: This conflicts with a report that North Korea began to reverse-engineer FROGs in the mid-1970s.]
—Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
Late 1970s
North Korea probably gains indigenous capability to produce the HQ-2 and HY-1 but is probably dependent upon China for some components.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 4.
Late 1970s
North Korea deploys indigenously produced AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). These weapons systems were reverse engineered after having been acquired from Egypt in 1974.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 8.
Late 1970s
North Korea begins to acquire Silkworm (HY-2) anti-ship missiles (ASMs) from China. North Korea later develops a modified version with an extended range of 160km and exports it to countries in the Middle East such as Iran and Iraq. The export price for the North Korean modified version is said to be $300,000-400,000 in 1994.
—Kim Chong Tu, "Silkworm Missile Iran/Kuso Kaebalhan 'Styx' Kaeryanghyŏng," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2 June 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1979-80
North Korea receives a small number of Soviet-made R-17E (Scud-B) missiles, MAZ-543 transporter erector launchers (TELs), and other equipment from Egypt. [Note: There is still a debate over the exact delivery date of the equipment.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.
1980
North Korea is believed to have completed the replacement of the HY-1 with the HY-2 missile.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's HY-2 'Silkworm' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, p. 206; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
1980
North Korea and Egypt sign an agreement to jointly develop missiles. The agreement stipulates that Egypt will supply North Korea with Soviet-made Scud-B missiles and MAZ-543 transporter erector launchers (TELs). According to Lee Jŏng Hun, a South Korean journalist, North Korea and Egypt finalize a bilateral agreement following Vice President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Pyongyang and meeting with Kim Il Sung in January 1980. The agreement provides for the delivery of two Soviet-made Scud-B missiles. Egypt's provision of the missiles violates an Egyptian agreement with the USSR. According to Chang Chun Ik, a retired lieutenant general and former National Assembly member, North Korea commits to expanding its missile development facilities in the Pyongyang area, and to establishing missile-testing facilities at Hwadae-kun in North Hamgyŏng Province upon signing this agreement.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202.
Late 1980
The North Korean Military Construction Bureau's 110th and 115th regiments complete construction of a missile base on Mayang-do, Mayang-dong, Shinp'o, South Hamgyŏng Province. Anti-ship missiles (ASMs) are later deployed to this base. According to North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn, the base already existed in the 1970s and was not fortified with tunnels and underground facilities until 1980. Im says the base has anti-ship missiles to protect North Korea's largest submarine base at Mayang-do.
—Im Yŏng Sŏn interview by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 14 December 2001, Seoul; Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
Circa 1980
North Korea possibly reverse engineers Scud-B without approval from the USSR.
—SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 275.
Early 1980s
North Korea is indigenously producing many parts of the Chinese HY-2 missile except for the sustainer motors and guidance systems, which are still provided by China.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's HY-2 'Silkworm' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, p. 206; Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
Early 1980s
Citing a "CIA report that was leaked to the press in 1996," the Joongang Ilbo reports that China, Egypt, and North Korea begin to cooperate in the production of ballistic missiles. The report claims that Egypt begins to acquire advanced US technology and components and then transfers them to China, which then transfers them to North Korea. North Korea then produces Scud missiles at armament factories in Chagang Province, near the Chinese border, and ships the missiles to Egypt. This report suggests that the North Koreans are merely a subcontractor for the Chinese.
—Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Shilche Tŭronaen Pukhan Missile Connection," Joongang Ilbo, 24 June 1996, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
Early 1980s
North Korea is receiving Chinese assistance in the areas of rocket engine design, metallurgy, and airframe technology as part of North Korea's effort to reverse-engineer the Scud-B.
—Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales—Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
1980s
According to an anonymous US intelligence official, North Korea sells about 100 Scud missile launchers to Iran. [Note: The January 1991 report also quotes the official as saying that Iraq wants to buy the launchers from Iran. Any North Korean Scud launcher sales almost certainly took place after 1985.]
—Associated Press, "U.S. Says Iraq Trying to Buy Scud Launchers," Toronto Star, 30 January 1991, p. A30, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1981
North Korea and Egypt agree to cooperate on the development of ballistic missiles. Egypt transfers two Soviet-built Scud-B missiles and MAZ 543 transporter erector launchers (TELs) to North Korea.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249-250, 257, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1981
According to information provided by North Korean defector Kim Kil Sŏn in an April 2001 interview, North Korea had received copies of Soviet-made Scud missiles by 1981. She is not sure of the number, where they came from, or when they arrived. However, she claims the first North Korean version of the Scud-B was produced in 1984 and named "Hwasŏng-1." However, in December 1999, Kim was quoted in the Chugan Donga as saying that North Korea produced its first copies of the Scud-B in 1981. [Note: Kim is a former writer and journalist assigned to North Korea's Second Natural Science Academy, which is responsible for weapons R&D in North Korea. Kim defected to South Korea in January 1999. The interview data represent the correct version of her interpretation of events.]
—Kim Kil Sŏn interview by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, on 10 April 2001, Seoul; Lee Jŏng Hun, "Pukhan Missile Silche Irŭmŭn 'Hwasŏng,'" Chugan Donga, 9 December 1999, p. 30.
1981
According to Yun Dŏk Min of South Korea's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, North Korea produces its first copy of the Scud-B.
—Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsangŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang" IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 1.
21 August 1981
Egypt and North Korea sign an agreement for technological cooperation and exchange through 1983. The technology in question may have included missile-related technologies.
—Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 1981, in "Other Reports; N Korean Scientific Agreement with Egypt," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 August 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "International Relations; Egypt—Scientific Technical Co-operation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 1992, pp. 452-458.
26 August 1981
North Korea fires an SA-2 SAM at a US SR-71 reconnaissance plane. However, the missile fails to hit the aircraft, which returns safely to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan. The US State Department condemns the launch, claiming the aircraft was operating in international airspace, and that the launch violates international law and the Korean War Armistice. According to news reports, the missile is fired from Chokta-ri; however, North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn claims the missile is fired from Paeg'un-dong, Kusŏng, North P'yŏng'an Province.
— Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 14 December 2001, Seoul; David Shribman, "Missile Fired by North Koreans at U.S. Spy Plane Near the DMZ," New York Times, 27 August 1981, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Lescaze, "U.C. Calls N. Korea 'Lawless' in Firing Missile at Spy Plane: U.S> Says North Korea Perpetrated 'Act of Lawlessness' in Missile Firing," Washington Post, 28 August 1981, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Expresses 'Serious Concern' Over Firing of North Korea Missile," New York Times, 28 August 1981, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Binder, "Radar Detector Aboard SR-71 Alerted Pilot to Missile Attack," New York Times, 29 August 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Milt Freudenheim and Barbara Slavin, "The World in Summary: A Long Shot Fired Over Korea," New York Times, 30 August 1981, Section 4, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Foreign Office Concedes SR-71 Departed from Okinawa," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 27 August 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Shin, "U.S. Warns North Korea on Missile Crisis," United Press International, 1 September 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
28 August 1981
The North Korean media deny the surface-to-ari missile (SAM) launch of 26 August, accusing the United States of "slandering North Korea."
—Henry Scott Stokes, "North Korea Disputes U.S. Over Missile-Firing Incident," New York Times, 29 August 1981, Section 1, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "North Korea Denies Missile Firing," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 August 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 September 1981
During the 407th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at P'anmunjŏm, North Korean Army Major General Han Ju Kyŏng denies the charges that North Korea fired a SAM at a US SR-71 reconnaissance plane on 26 August. Han calls the accusation "a sheer fabrication to find a pretext for an arms buildup and to unleash another war on the Korean peninsula."
—Paul Shin, "U.S. Warns North Korea on Missile Crisis," United Press International, 1 September 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
2 September 1981
South Korean Defense Minister Chu Yŏng Bok tells the South Korean National Assembly that North Korea has various SAMs, including the SA-2 and SA-7, and anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Chu says that North Korea has deployed SA-2 SAMs at 45 sites along its border with South Korea.
—"Spyplanes Fly Again Over Korea," United Press International, 2 September 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1982
North Korea opens its missile test center at Musudan-ri, North Hamgyŏng Province.
—Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
April 1982
North Korea attempts first flight-test of an indigenously modified Scud, but the test fails.
—Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
1982-83
North Korean engineers continue to reverse-engineer the Soviet-made R17Es (Scud-Bs) received from Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.
April 1983
North Korea successfully flight tests an indigenously produced Scud-B prototype. [Note: This report is highly suspect without significant technical and other assistance from abroad.]
—Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
5 April 1983
In Pyongyang, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak discusses arms purchases and signs an agreement to extend the 1981 technological exchange agreement between Egypt and North Korea. The agreement contains several references to "other fields as to be agreed upon by the governments of the two countries."
—Korean Central News Agency, 5 April 1983, in "Text of General Agreement," FBIS-APA-83-067, 6 April 1983, pp. D11-D13.
6 September 1983
Egyptian Defense Minister Marshal Abdal-Halim Abu Ghazhala, leading a military delegation, arrives in Pyongyang.
—Korean Central News Agency, 6 September 1983, in "Egyptian Military Delegation Arrives for Visit," FBIS-APA-83-174, 7 September 1983, p. D11; KCNA (Pyongyang), 7 September 1983, in "Further Reportage on Visit of Egyptian Defense Minister," FBIS-APA-83-175, 8 September 1983, pp. D11-D15.
9 October 1983
North Korean commandos detonate a remote-controlled bomb in Rangoon that kills 21 people, including four South Korean cabinet ministers. The bomb is intended for South Korean President Chun Du Hwan, who escaped unharmed when he arrives late for a wreath-laying ceremony at the Martyrs' Mausoleum. Two North Korean army officers are later captured, and a third is shot and killed. The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang later calls Chun's statement linking North Korea to the blast as "a preposterous and ridiculous act." [Note: The incident is the reason for Chun's decision to restart South Korea's Hyŏnmu ballistic missile program.]
—Don Oberdorfer, "Blast Kills Top Aides To South Korean President: Tensions Likely to Rise," Washington Post, 10 October 1983, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Anne Charters and Chris Sherwell, "Burma Bomb Kills Four Key members of South Korean Cabinet," Financial Times (London), 10 October 1983, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency, 12 October 1983, in "North Korean Statement on Rangoon Bombing," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 October 1983, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Chit Tun, "North Koreans Sentenced to Death for Burmese Bombing," United Press International, 9 December 1983, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; William Branigin, "Burmese Accused of Aiding N. Korean Bombers May Face Trial," Washington Post, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chong Dok Sang, "[Missile] Kaebal Kyesokhaettdamyŏn Tomahawk Nŭngga," Hankook Ilbo, 15 July 1999, <http://www.hankooki.com>.
25-26 October 1983
Iranian Prime Minister Ruhollah Musavi and Defense Minister Colonel Mohammed Salimi hold talks with North Korean Prime Minister Lee Chong Ok and Minister of the People's Armed Forces O Jin U. The parties reach an arrangement for the long-term Iranian financing of North Korea's Scud-B development program in exchange for Iran's option to purchase production models. Musavi and Salimi depart North Korea on 26 October after a three-day visit.
—Korean Central News Agency, 25 October and 26 October 1983, in "Iranian Prime Minister's Visit to North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 October 1983, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 1992, pp. 452-458; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202.
1984
North Korea produces first prototypes of the R-17E (Scud-B), which are named "Hwasŏng-5." According to Kim Kil Sŏn, the missiles are named "Hwasŏng-1."
—Interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10;
1984
North Korea signs an agreement to provide technical assistance in Egypt's attempt to produce its version of the SA-2b, the "Tair al-Sabah."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 13.
1984
North Korea orders approximately 240 Scud-B missiles from the USSR; the missiles are delivered from 1985 to 1988. About 100 are re-sold to Iran. [Note: This report, though unsubstantiated, establishes a "lower bound" for North Korea's efforts to reverse-engineer the Scud-B.]
—SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256.
1984
North Korea begins flight tests of indigenously produced Scud-Bs and modified (extended range, 330km) Scud-Bs. [Note: Compare with Hajime's reference to an April 1983 flight test of a Scud-B prototype.]
—Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
1984-85
The North Korean Ministry of People's Armed Forces is believed to have established a Hwasŏng missile regiment subordinate to the Artillery Command. This unit was probably first deployed near Pyongyang and later moved to Chiha-ri.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 11.
March 1984
According to an indictment issued by the US Federal District Court in New York City, Babak Soroush, president of the exporting firm International Processing Systems, sends a preliminary shipment of 143 semiconductors to North Korea. The components allegedly can be used in weapon-guidance systems. Yuri Geifman, owner of Industrial and Scientific Parts Services in New York City, later pleads guilty to charges that he sent the components to Soroush for transshipment to North Korea.
—Ellan Cates, "Iranian Businessman Faces Conspiracy Charges," United Press International, 6 November 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Taylor, "Iranian Accused of 'Chip Smuggling' by Grand Jury," Financial Times (London), 9 November 1984, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "West German Indicted in Smuggling Scheme," United Press International, 28 May 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Manhattan Executive Guilty in Exports Case," New York Times, 6 November 1985, p. B2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 21.
April 1984
North Korea conducts its first successful test of a Scud-B missile. During 1984, additional tests are conducted with at least two known failures.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 184-185; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, in "North's Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed," JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9.
9 April 1984
North Korea conducts at least three tests of its indigenously produced Scud-B missile at the Hwadae-kun (Musudan-ri) missile test center.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 266-267.
11 May 1984
Yuri Geifman, owner of Industrial and Scientific Parts Services in New York City, sends a package containing 392 controlled electronics components to West Germany for transshipment to North Korea. The components allegedly can be used in weapon-guidance systems.
—Ellan Cates, "Iranian Businessman Faces Conspiracy Charges," United Press International, 6 November 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Taylor, "Iranian Accused of 'Chip Smuggling' by Grand Jury," Financial Times (London), 9 November 1984, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "West German Indicted in Smuggling Scheme," United Press International, 28 May 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Manhattan Executive Guilty in Exports Case," New York Times, 6 November 1985, p. B2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 21.
16 May 1984
Kim Il Sung departs North Korea for Moscow by train. The delegation includes Kim Jong Il, Premier Kang Sŏng San, and North Korean Defense Minister O Jin U. South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Wŏn Kyŏng suspects that Kim will seek weapons such as MIG-25 fighters and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), as well as economic and Soviet technical assistance while in Moscow.>
—"North Korean Leader Seeks Soviet Support," United Press International, 18 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "President Kim Il Sung Passes Through Northeast China on way to Soviet Union," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 18 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "International," United Press International, 17 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
23-25 May 1984
Kim Il Sung holds three rounds of talks with Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko in Moscow. The two leaders agree to increase security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and sources say Chernenko agrees to increase military aid to North Korea. After Kim departs Moscow for Poland, North Korean Defense Minister O Jin U remains in Moscow, presumably to continue details talks on military cooperation.
—Xinhua News Agency, "Kim Il Sung Arrives in Moscow for Visit," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 23 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "North Korean, Soviet Premiers Meet," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "Russo-N. Korean Summit Talks End," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; John F. Burns, "Moscow Talks End for North Korean," New York Times, 26 May 1984, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "Kim Arrives in Poland, His Top Aide Remaining in Moscow," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 May 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Dusko Doder, "N. Korean Leader Concludes First Moscow Visit in 19 Years," Washington Post, 27 May 1984, p. A18, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
September 1984
Since the April 1984 test-launch, there have been at least two additional "confirmed" launches of North Korean-built Scud-B prototypes from the Musudan-ri test facility. The first successful Scud-B launches occur during this time frame. Joseph Bermudez cites interview data in 1999 that claims there were three successful and three failed flight tests in April and September 1984.
—Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, in "North's Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed," JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 10-11.
29 September- 4 October 1984
North Korea delivers rice, textiles, cement, and medicine to South Korea as aid in response to torrential rains that killed over 200 and left over 200,000 homeless in South Korea. [Note: The unprecedented delivery of goods marks a sudden and drastic, but short-lived, thaw in inter-Korean relations.]
—John Burgess, "Seoul Accepts North Korea's Offer of Aid," Washington Post, 15 September 1984, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Agrewwes to South Korean Demands on Relief Aid," United Press International, 20 September 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burgess and Young Ho Lee, "N. Korean Aid, In Historic trip, Reaches South," Washington Post, 30 September 1984, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Whymant, "North Korean Aid Arrives in South," The Guardian (London), 1 October 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "KCNA Issues Press Communique on Completion of Goods-delivery for South Korean Flood-Victims," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 5 October 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Facts on File, "South Korea Gets Relief Supplies from North Korea: Seoul Had Charged Propaganda Ploy," Facts on File World News Digest, 5 October 1984, p. 726 C2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
10 October 1984
Yuri Geifman and Iranian businessman Babak Soroush are indicted in New York for conspiracy to smuggle components used in missile guidance to North Korea. Geifman later pleads guilty to having shipped $9,000 worth of controlled electronics components to Soroush's firm in West Germany for transshipment to North Korea. West Germany later refuses to extradite Seroush to the United States.
—Ellan Cates, "Iranian Businessman Faces Conspiracy Charges," United Press International, 6 November 1984, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Taylor, "Iranian Accused of 'Chip Smuggling' by Grand Jury," Financial Times (London), 9 November 1984, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "West German Indicted in Smuggling Scheme," United Press International, 28 May 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Manhattan Executive Guilty in Exports Case," New York Times, 6 November 1985, p. B2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "The North Korean 'Scud B' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, April 1989, pp. 177-181; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Knut Royce, "FBI Tracked Alleged Russian Mob Ties of Guiliani Campaign Supporter," The Public for Public Integrity, 14 December 2000, <http://www.public-1.org>.
9 November 1984
North Korean Defense Minister O Jin U arrives in Egypt for a 12-day visit during which an agreement to provide technical assistance to the Egyptian SA-2b Mod 1 surface-to-air-missile (SAM) program may have been reached.
—Korean Central News Agency, 8 November 1984, in "Military Delegation Leaves for Egyptian Visit," FBIS-APA, 8 November 1984, pp. D19-D20; KCNA, 21 November 1984, in "O Chin-U-Led Military Group Returns from Egypt," FBIS-APA, 27 November 1984, p. D14; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.
23 November 1984
A gun battle erupts at the Joint Security Area in P'anmunjŏm when a Soviet citizen defects during a tour. Three North Korean soldiers and one South Korean soldier die, and one American soldier is wounded in the shootout. Four days later, North Korea calls off economic talks with South Korea scheduled for 5 December at P'anmunjŏm.
—Clyde Haberman, "3 Koreans Killed as Soldiers Trade Shots in the DMZ," New York Times, 24 November 1984, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burgess, "U.S. Says Defector Will Not Return: DMZ Shoot-out Discussed at Panmunjom," Washington Post, 25 November 1984, p. A30, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Clyde Haberman, "U.S. and North Korea Trade Charges on DMZ Clash," New York Times, 25 November 1984, p. 3, , in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burgess, "N. Koreans Cancel Talks With South: Shoot-out Is Said To Spoil Prospects," Washington Post, 28 November 1984, p. A23, , in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Late 1984-early 1985
North Korea helps establish a Hwasŏng-5 assembly plant in Iran. [Note: The type of assistance is unclear. However, North Korea does not establish its own Scud-B production plant until 1987, and a subsequent report says North Korea assists Iran in the building of a Scud-B production plant in 1987.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 13.
Mid 1980s
North Korea acquires HJ-73 and HN-5A surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from China.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 13.
1985
In a bilateral accord, Iran agrees to finance North Korea's reverse-engineering of the Scud-B and offers assistance in the covert procurement of Western critical technologies in exchange for production technology and missiles. The agreement also calls for mutual support in missile development and for Iran to have the first right to purchase North Korean-produced modified Scud-B missiles.
—Kenneth Timmerman, Mednews, 21 December 1992, p. 5; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 269-270; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran's Medium-Range Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1992, p. 147.
1985
"Pilot production" of the Scud-B is believed to have begun, replacing that of North Korea's Scud-B prototype. The new missiles have a an extended range of about 20-40km more than the Soviet Scud-B, and the missile is named "Hwasŏng-5."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 268-269; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 11.
1985
North Korea and the USSR reach an agreement for the Soviets to assist in the modernization of the North Korean military. As a result, North Korea eventually receives SA-3b Goa and SA-5 Gammon missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 13.
1985
North Korea begins production of modified Scud-B missiles and deploys them at a newly established missile unit near Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270.
1985
"North Korea, China and others" provide assistance as Iran begins work on the Mushak-120 missile at a Chinese-built factory near Semnan, Iran.
—Raytheon, "Strategic: Mushak 120," Missile Systems of the World (Lexington: Raytheon, 1999), p. 456.
1985
North Korea agrees to supply Iran with HN-5A surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and to help build assembly plants for the HN-5A, HQ-2 SAM and Scud-B. North Korea also offers to provide advisors and technology transfers for Iran's missile and rocket program.
— Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran's Medium-Range Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1992, p. 147; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: the New Suppliers' Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 53-55.
1985
North Korea begins breaking ground for the construction of a missile base near Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province. The site is located in the eastern part of Shin'gye-kun near the border with Kangwŏn Province. The North Korean Air Force Construction Department under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces Construction Bureau does the construction. During the construction, the construction unit calls the missiles that are to be deployed to the base, "Kuksan" (literally "national product") or "Hwasŏng," but with no number designation. The missiles are said to be capable of striking the Kŭm River in South Korea, which is approximately 300km away. According to North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn, based on his readings of construction plans and his conversations with officers responsible for the construction, there would be two ways to launch missiles from the base: (1) from an underground "launch site" or pad; or (2) by moving the missiles from an underground storage area. Im says they built the underground tunnels for the missiles "like the Russians did." North Korea halts construction of the base in late 1985 according to Im, who believes there is a problem in obtaining the missiles for deployment. [Note: The indirect reference to the range of the missiles indicates they are Scud-Bs. The US Air Base at Kunsan is at the mouth of the Kŭm River and within range of any Scud-B missiles deployed at Shin'gye.]
—Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
27 March 1985
The Los Angeles Times quotes Jane's Defence Weekly as reporting, "The Soviet Union's Scud missiles are sold, however, to Libya, Syria and North Korea...." However, the Jane's report says, "Scuds have been supplied to Libya, Syria, and North Korea...." [Note: The Jane's report is unclear about the origin of the North Korean Scuds, which may have been supplied by Egypt instead of the Soviet Union.]
—"Iraqi Jets Attack Ship in Gulf, Kill 9 in Raid on Tehran," Los Angeles Times, 27 March 1985, p. 17, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Derek Wood, "Iran Uses Scud Missile Against Iraq," Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 March 1985, p. 532.
Summer 1985
Iran approaches both North Korea and China looking for ballistic missiles and missile technology.
—Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales—Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
23 July 1985
Ten members, five each from the South Korean National Assembly and the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly meet at P'anmunjŏm. The meeting is the first ever between legislators from the two sides. The North Koreans say the meeting should address a non-aggression declaration, while the South Koreans say the agenda should focus on a standing South Korean proposal for a unified constitution. Although no significant agreements are reached, the two sides agree to meet again on 25 September 1985.
—Paul Shin, "South, North Korea Lawmakers Hold First Talks in 40 Years," United Press International, 23 July 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North and South Koreans Meet," Washington Post, 23 July 1985, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Around the World: After 40 Years, 2 Koreas Meet but Still Disagree," New York Times, 24 July 1985, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "The World: Korean Foes Hold Meeting," Los Angeles Times, 24 July 1985, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
September 1985
Sources in Seoul report that North Korea has been receiving Scud missiles and other weapons, including MIG-23 fighter aircraft, from the USSR as part of expanded military ties. In return, North Korea has granted the USSR access to its air space.
—"'Soviet Base' in North Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 September 1985, p. 3.
20-23 September 1985
North and South Korea allow family visits across the border for the first time. Fifty Koreans from each side cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) at P'anmunjŏm to visit family members in Seoul and Pyongyang. North Korea also sends an "art troupe" to Seoul for the historic exchange.
—Clyde Haberman, "Korean Families Visit After Border Is Opened," New York Times, 21 September 1985, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sam Jameson, "North, South Koreans Exchange Visits: 151 From Either Side in 1st Crossing Since Country's Split in 1945," Los Angeles Times, 21 September 1985, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven B. Butler, "North and South Koreans Reunite," Christian Science Monitor, 23 September 1985, p. 11, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sam Jameson, "Sorrow Outweighs Joy as Koreans End Their Visits," Los Angeles Times, 24 September 1985, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency, 23 September 1985, in "South Korean Red Cross Group Leaves Pyongyang," in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Li Tu and Cao Haorong, "Happy Meetings Between Family Members after Long Separation," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 22 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "Pyongyang Art troupe Gives Premiere in Seoul," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 22 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Clyde Haberman, "Groups of Koreans Cross Border, Ending Kin Visit," New York Times, 24 September 1985, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
25 September 1985
A second round of talks between North and South Korean legislators is held, but the meeting ends without an agreement for a future agenda. The North Koreans insist on a broad agenda to reduce tension, which the South Koreans call "vague." The South Koreans repeat their suggestion that the two sides should focus on drafting a constitution for a unified Korea.
—Kyodo News Service, "Parliamentarians Meeting Ends With No Progress," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Li Tu and Qu Benjin, "2nd Meeting for North-South Korean Parliamentary Talks," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 25 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "DPRK Stresses Publication of Declaration of Non-Aggression," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 25 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Koreas' Legislators Meet," Washington Post, 26 September 1985, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
28 September 1985
North Korea denies recent news reports that the USSR "has begun shipping about 70 surface-to-surface missiles [(SSMs)] and about 60 surface-to-air missiles [(SAMs)] to Iran via Syria and North Korea." The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang calls the allegations "a wholly groundless lie" and a "fabrication of the Western trumpeters...."
—Korean Central News Agency, 28 September 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 September 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Denies Tehran Reports" Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 October 1985, p. 857.
1985-88
North Korea receives delivery of approximately 240 Scud-B missiles that were ordered from the USSR in 1984. About 100 are re-sold to Iran. This report is unsubstantiated, but it establishes a "lower bound" for North Korea's program to reverse-engineer the Scud-B.
—SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256.
Circa 1985
The North Korean Military Construction Bureau completes construction of an "intermediate-range" missile base on Mt. Kanggamch'an across from the Kanep'o Fisheries Cooperative in Chŭngsan-kun, South Pyŏngan Province. The North Korean Navy also completed the construction of a surface-to-ship missile base in early 1990 at this site.
—Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
Late 1985
North Korea halts construction of a missile base in Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province. The site is located in the eastern part of Shin'gye-kun near the border with Kangwŏn Province. North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn, who was working at the construction site, believes the project is stopped because there is a problem in obtaining the missiles for deployment at the base. [Note: See <1985 entry on the construction of the Shin'gye missile base>.]
—Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
1986
A special North Korean missile unit is established and becomes operational. It is presumed to have derived from a special test and eval uation unit, and is believed to have been stationed at T'ŏgol, Pyŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22.
1986
The North Korean Military Construction Bureau completes the construction of a long-range missile base in "Paeg'un-dong, Kusŏng," North Pyŏngan Province in 1986. [Note: According to North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn, this was the surface-to-air missile (SAM) base that fired an SA-2 at a US SR-71 reconnaissance plane in August 1981. Ko refers to Kusŏng as a "kun," but it became a city, or "shi," in October 1967. He also refers to "Paeg'un-dong" as "Paeg'un-ri." However, "Paeg'un" is now a "dong," which is an administrative area within a city.]
—Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997; interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
1986
North Korea begins mass-producing about 4-5 modified Scud-Bs (Hwasŏng-5) per month, later increasing production to 8-12 missiles per month. Bermudez estimates that production is about 4 or 5 a month in the early stages, but increases to about 8-10 per month in 1987-88.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 11; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 24; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, vol. 33, no. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1986
North Korea and Iran sign an agreement for North Korea to supply Iran with HY-2 anti-ship missiles (ASMs). [Note: The deliveries begin in 1987-1988.]
—Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
May 1986
North Korea conducts a successful flight test of its Scud-C. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated and probably in error.]
—Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19.
22 October 1986
North Korean President Kim Il Sung travels to Moscow to meet with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov for the first time. Kim is believed to ask for advanced weapons from the USSR.
—Jasper Becker, "Missile Deal for N. Korea/Soviet Union to Supply SS-21s to Counter US Deployment in South Korea," The Guardian (London), 29 January 1987, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Watts, "Joint Military Exercise Between Japan and US Worries Russians," The Times (London), 29 October 1986, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
December 1986
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) transfers control of the completed integrated circuit pilot factory, the Pyongyang Semiconductor Manufacturing Factory, to North Korea's Electronics Institute.
—Terminal Report on Project: DP/DRK/79/003; Establishment of Digital Bi-Polar Integrated Circuit Plant in DPR of Korea, (New Delhi: ET&T Development Corporation Ltd.).
7 December 1986
The Iranian parliament restructures all of North Korea's $170 million oil purchase debt to Iran. The debt will be paid back over the next five years starting retroactively from January 1985. During this period, Iran will deduct 70% of the cost of North Korean merchandise purchased from the debt, paying onl y the remaining 30% in cash.
—IRNA (Tehran), 7 December 1986, in "Majlis Reschedules 'Entirety' of DPRK Debt," FBIS-NES, 10 December 1986, p. 15.
1987
Scud-B production facilities are established near Pyongyang with an annual capacity of 50 missiles. According to Chang Chun Ik, the facility is located in Tok'kol-dong, Sŭngho-kuyŏk, Pyongyang. South Korean military officials say North Korea has at least 12 mobile launchers about 40-50km north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 2 February 1991, in "Information Provided on DPRK Scud Missiles," JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 6-7; Nam Yong Chin, Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), 8 February 1991, p. 8, in "DPRK's Advanced Weapons Analyzed," JPRS-TND-91-008, 31 May 1991, pp. 7-9; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 272; Kyodo News Service, "Asian News; N. Korea Deploys Scuds, May Reach Whole S. Korea in 1992," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; United Press International, "North Korea Builds Own Scud Missiles," 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhan, Yŏngbyŏnsŏ Kop'okpalshilhŏm/Kunchŏngbodangguk/Ch'oegŭn Haekshilhŏm Chŏndan'gyech'uchŏng Hŭnjŏk," Hankook Ilbo, 27 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1987
North Korea provides assistance to establish a Scud-B production plant in Egypt.
—Lee Chae Hak, "Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such'ul/Shimsangch'anh'ŭn Taechungdong P'anmaesŏl," Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1987
North Korea helps Iran set up a modified Scud-B assembly plant, which becomes operational by the spring of 1988.
—Andrew Rathmell, with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995, p. 20.
1987
North Korea provides Iran with technical assistance to begin producing Scud-B (Shehab-1) missiles.
—Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999, in "Mideast Missile Race Detailed," FBIS Document ID FTS19990903000290.
1987
North Korea exports 100 Scud-B missiles to Iran.
—Andrew Rathmell, with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995, p. 20.
1987-88
North Korea begins working on development of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 14-15.
1987-88
North Korea exports about 100 Scud missiles to Iran.
—Kim Chun Pŏm, "Pukhan'ŭi Haek-Missile Kisulsujun Ŏddŏn'ga," Joongang Ilbo, 19 March 1992, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1987-88
North Korea delivers HY-2 anti-ship missiles (ASMs) to Iran. [Note: The agreement for the shipments was signed in 1986.]
—Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749.
1987-1992
North Korea exports 250 missiles worth $580 million to countries in the Middle East, including Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
—Lim Yun-Suk, "US and N. Korea to Hold Talks on Pyongyang's Missile Exports," Agence France Presse, 28 March 1999.
1987-1992
According to Jane's Intelligence Review, North Korea exports 200-300 Scud-B missiles to Iran.
—Andrew Rathmell, with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995, p. 20.
28 January 1987
South Korean Defense Minister Lee Ki Baek announces that North Korea has conducted a secret test of a "long-range guided missile" north of the city of Wŏnsan in South Hamgyŏng Province. South Korean Defense Ministry officials refuse to release details of the missile test. [Note: The missile test was most likely conducted in May 1986 at the Musudan-ri test facility.]
—Korea Herald, 29 January 1987, p. 1, in "Defense Minister on DPRK Submarine, Rocket Test," FBIS-APA-87-020, 30 January 1987, pp. E4-E5.
29 January 1987
The Guardian reports that the USSR has secretly agreed to sell SS-21 ballistic missiles to North Korea in response to the US deployment of Lance missiles in South Korea. [Note: The SS-21, or a modified version, could be the third stage of the Paektusan-1 launch on 31 August 1998 that failed to place the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 satellite into earth orbit.]
—Jasper Becker, "Missile Deal for N Korea/Soviet Union to Supply SS-21s to Counter US Deployment in South Korea," The Guardian (London), 29 January 1987, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 April 1987
North Korea holds an opening ceremony for a new integrated circuit factory about 30km north of Pyongyang. The factory is affiliated with the Electronic Engineering Industry Research Institute under the Academy of Sciences. The factory is a joint venture with the United Nations Development Program.
—"DPRK-UNDP Joint Venture to Make Electronics," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 9 April 1987, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
11 April 1987
Kim Jong Il visits the Second Natural Science Academy (Chae 2 Chayŏn'gwahag'wŏn). Kim says "there will be nothing to fear if the Hwasŏng-6 is developed; the American bastards won't be able to do anything." [Note: Kim Kil Sŏn claims the Nodong missile is called the "Hwasŏng-5" and that the Paektusan-1/Taepodong-1 is called "Hwasŏng-6."]
—Kim Kil Sŏn interview by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 10 April 2001, Seoul; "Taepodong 2 Ho Optta," Joongang Ilbo, 12 January 2000, <http://www.joins.com>.
June 1987
In response to a Reagan administration protest over the sale of HY-2 Silkworm missiles to Iran, China denies that it made the sale. According to the New York Times, US officials do not believe the denial, but one anonymous White House source says China contends the missiles are coming from North Korea.
—Gerald B. Boyd, "U.S. Says China Is Arming Iran, Despite Denial," New York Times, 7 June 1987, pp. A1, A15.
June 1987
As a continuation of their 1985 bilateral accord, Iran and North Korea complete a $500 million military assistance agreement, which includes the purchase of 90-100 North Korean Scud missiles, 12 transporter erector launchers (TELs), and an unknown number of North Korean-built HY-2 Silkworm missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's HY-2 'Silkworm' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran's Medium-Range Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1992, pp. 147-148; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 12.
10 June 1987
North Korea denies Western press reports that it is acting as a conduit for Chinese Silkworm missile deliveries to Iran.
—Korean Central News Agency, 10 June 1987, in "Rumor of Arms to Iran Called 'Malicious Lie'," FBIS-EAS-87-111, 10 June 1987, p. C1.
July 1987
Deliveries of Scud-B (Hwasŏng-5) missiles from the Iranian order begin. The deliveries are believed to have been made by sea and continue through February 1988. The missile is called "Shehab-1" in Iran. According to the International Defense Review, the first batch of shipments total 100 for use in the Iran-Iraq War, and the number eventually reaches 400 missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 12; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Acacemic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
About November 1987
US intelligence satellites spot Silkworm missiles at a North Korean port.
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Chinese Missiles Are Apparently on Way to Iran," Wall Street Journal, 21 December 1987, p. 15.
8 November 1987
Keyhan, a conservative Iranian daily, quotes the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps minister as having said, "At present we are copying Scud-B missiles. A factory is about to be completed." [Note: The missiles are most likely North Korean Scud-B "clones."]
—Keyhan (Tehran), 8 November 1987, p. 2, in "IRGC Commander, Minister Outline Arms production," FBIS-NES-87-222, 18 November 1987, p. 55.
13 December 1987
A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. says, "We have never sold Silkworms to Iran, and we have already taken measures to stop sales of Silkworm missiles on the international market."
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Chinese Missiles Are Apparently on Way to Iran," Wall Street Journal, 21 December 1987, p. 15.
14 December 1987
The Wall Street Journal reports that US intelligence satellite photographs last week have revealed that the Silkworm missiles spotted at a North Korean port in November 1987 are now gone, as is an Iranian vessel that is known to have made previous Silkworm deliveries to Iran.
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Chinese Missiles Are Apparently on Way to Iran," Wall Street Journal, 21 December 1987, p. 15.
Early 1988
Iran purchases 40 Scud-B missiles from North Korea. The missiles are employed during the War of the Cities from February 1988 to April 1988. [Note: These missiles may be part of the June 1987 purchase rather than an additional purchase. This may also be a reference to one of the missile deliveries taking place from July 1987 to February 1988.]
—Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.
1988
Iran begins limited-scale assembly of North Korean Scud-B missiles from "knock-down kits" at a facility near Isfahan, Iran's largest ballistic missile plant.
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs," Mednews, 21 December 1992, pp. 4-5; Andrew Rathmell with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995, p. 20.
1988
North Korea establishes a Scud-B regiment within the IV Corps in the southwest of the country. one source indicates that North Korea deploys Scud missiles at Shin'gye, North Hwanghae Province, which is located in the II Corps area. A Yonhap News Agency report in 1993 claims the deployment consisted of Scud-C missiles. [Note: This could be the first deployment of North Korean produced Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B) missiles in North Korea.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19.
1988
North Korea begins its Scud-B upgrade (Scud-C) program to double the missile's range to 600km. The program includes extending the length of the missile, fuel, and oxidizer tanks by one meter. The size of the warhead is reduced from 985kg to 700kg, and an improved inertial guidance system is installed. [Note: This conflicts with reports of a Scud-C flight test in May 1986.]
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 272-273; Kyodo News Service, "Asian News; N. Korea Deploys Scuds, May Reach Whole S. Korea in 1992," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; United Press International, "North Korea Builds Own Scud Missiles," 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 1991, in "Information Provided on DPRK Scud Missiles," JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 6-7.
1988
Iran provides North Korea with wreckage of Al-Hussein missiles used by Iraq in the "war of the cities." This may have helped with the North Korean program to produce the Scud-C.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 275-276.
1988
North Korea begins development of the Nodong missile.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 20; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19.
1988
The North Korean Military Construction Bureau's 117th Regiment completes construction of a missile base in Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province. The base has underground facilities with missiles designed to strike Japan.
—Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
1988
A "South Korean military source" claims that North Korea sends 90 military officials and weapons specialists to Yinchuan, China to learn "nuclear testing technology" and "missile flight testing technology." The claim is made in December 1991, but the length and type of training is uncertain. [Note: The number is most likely a cumulative total between 1988 and December 1991.]
—"Pukhan, Chungguksŏ Tat'andu Missile Shilhŏm/Sajŏng 8 Baek km Chunggŏriyong," Seoul Shinmun (Taehan Maeil), p. 1, 7 December 1991, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1988
According to Jane's Intelligence Review, US Department of Defense sources claim that North Korea "is still importing rocket engine technology and guidance components from China."
—Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales—Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
Early January 1988
According to US intelligence sources, Iran receives a large shipment of arms from North Korea. The shipment arrives at the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas and contains "four Soviet Styx anti-ship missiles and at least one Silkworm anti-ship missile."
—John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran Last Year," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
19 January 1988
North Korea denies allegations made in the US news media that Chinese-made Silkworm missiles are being supplied to Iran via North Korea.
—Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 1988, in "KCNA Denies Silkworms Shipped to Iran," FBIS-EAS-88-011, 19 January 1988, pp. 14-15.
Early February 1988
Deliveries from the June 1987 North Korean Scud-B sale to Iran are completed. The deliveries began in 1987 and total about 100 missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270.
Late February 1988
According to British and US military sources quoted by the United Arab Emirates newspaper Al-Ittihad, the Iranian ship Iran Teyfouri delivers "80 HY-2 Silkworm and 40 Scud-B missiles from China and North Korea" to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The report says, "China and North Korea recently sold Iran 80 surface-to-surface Silkworm missiles and 40 Soviet-made Scud Missiles." [Note: The report does not clearly define "Soviet-made" as "Soviet-manufactured" or "Soviet-designed and North Korean produced."]
—Agence France Presse (Paris), 1 April 1988, in "Government Buys Chinese, N. Korean Missiles," FBIS-NES-88-063, 1 April 1988, p. 45.
14 April 1988
Iranian First Deputy Defense Colonel Rahimi states, "We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km." He also says that Iran is now "manufacturing different types of batteries for missile-launchers that they onc e purchased." [Note: The range given is consistent with the North Korean-upgraded Scud-B missile.]
—Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, in "Radio Phone-In Program with Defense Officials," FBIS-NES-88-073, 15 April 1988, p. 51.
October 1988
Partially in response to North Korean efforts to acquire missile technology, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) bans the export of missile-related components abroad.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "The North Korean 'Scud B' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, April 1989, pp. 177-181.
Late 1988
North Korea and Iran establish a secret joint military commission to facilitate military cooperation.
—Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.
1989
North Korea begins development of the Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
—Yu Yong Won, Chosun Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 4, in "Reporting on Status of Missile Development," JPRS-TND-94-008, 1 April 1994, pp. 12-13; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Shinhyŏngjidaeji 'Taepodong12ho' [sic] Sajŏnggŏri 2Ch'ŏn ~ 3Ch'ŏn5Baek km," Chosun Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1989
Anritsu Corp., Yokohama Machinery Trading Co., and one other Japanese company allegedly sell spectrum analyzers to North Korea via China. Yokohama Machinery Trading Company transfers three spectrum analyzers and an accessory device to Beijing between January and March, but does not register the transfer with Japanese authorities. The spectrum analyzers are capable of discerning differences in UHF waves down to one wave per a few hundred million.
—Michiyo Nakamoto, "Japan Police in Export Raid: Machinery Sales to N. Korea May Have Breached Cocom Rules," Financial Times, 15 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "Japanese Hi-Tech in North Korean Missiles, Independent (London), 15 January 1994, p. 13; Lee Sŏk Ku, "'Nodong 1 Ho' Pupum Ilche Chupasubunsŏkki/Chungguk Kŏch'yŏ Milsu Ch'ujŏng," Joongang Ilbo, 15 January 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
1989
According to retired Israeli Brigadier General Aharon Levran, now an independent military analyst, Egypt turns to North Korea for assistance in upgrading its arsenal of Soviet-supplied Scud missiles. The nature of the assistance is not known but may consist of provision of spare parts or installation of improved components, including guidance. Levran also says that North Korea is helping Iran develop ballistic missiles. [Note: It has been five years since the Egypt-North Korean deals of the early 1980s. It is unclear what brought on the five-year lapse in the relationship.]
—Korea Times, 30 December 1989, p. 4, in "Missile Cooperation with North Korea Alleged," JPRS-TND-90-002, 17 January 1990, p. 12.
1989
North Korea and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) conclude an arms sales agreement worth $160 million. The deal stipulated that North Korea supply "25 Hwasŏng-5 missiles, self-propelled artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, and munitions." Some analysts claim the sale was a covert operation by the United States to acquire North Korean weapon systems.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 12.
1989
The (North) Korea International Joint Venture Corporation (朝鮮國際合營總公社) and Choch'ong nyŏn's [the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan] Committee for the Promotion of Joint Venture Business (朝總聯合營事業促進委員會) establish the Korea Joint Venture Bank (朝鮮合營銀行). The Korea Joint Venture Bank is mainly involved in international banking and has cooperation agreements with about 40 banks in countries such as Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, the United Kingdow, and Hong Kong. There is no direct evidence that the Korea Joint Venture Bank has been involved in missile-related transactions; however, Choch'ong nyŏn has reportedly provided components for the production of ballistic missiles. Therefore, there is a possibility that the Korea Joint Venture Bank could be involved in the financial services for any of these types of transactions. [Note: The Korea Ch'anggwang Credit Bank (朝鮮創光信用銀行) has been identified as the recipient of payments from the importers of North Korean ballistic missiles.]
—Ha Sŭng Pŏm, "Pukhanŭi Kiŏp List," Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, April 2002, <http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/business/com/ com006.php3nk/business/com/com006.php3>; M. O. Cho, "North Korean Company List," Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 10 January 2001, <http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/eng/main.php3nk/eng/main.php3>; Choch'ong nyŏn, "Ch'ong nyŏnhab'yŏngsaŏpch'ujinwiwŏnhoe," 2001, <http://www.chongryon.com/korea/dantai/jigyou.htm>; Web Kaigaijigyobu, "Chosenminsyusyugijinminkyowakokuhen: Kinyu," Tokyo Outosourcing Co. [sic], Ltd., 2001, <http://www.eeyo.net/cnt/NK/eco/ekinyu.html>.
January-March 1989
Yokohama Machinery Trading Company transfers three spectrum analyzers and an accessory device to Beijing, but does not register the transfer with Japanese authorities. The spectrum analyzers are capable of discerning differences in UHF waves down to one wave per a few hundred million.
—Lee Sŏk Ku, "'Nodong 1 Ho' Pupum Ilche Chupasubunsŏkki/Chungguk Kŏch'yŏ Milsu Ch'ujŏng," Joongang Ilbo, 15 January 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
6 February 1989
A Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee top secret report, special file number P147/75, states that "most recently, reports have begun to be actively circulated in the United States on the DPRK's (North Korea) creation of a chemical warfare potential, using missiles manufactured under license from us as delivery systems. It has emerged from information from our embassy in Pyongyang that this report is not without foundation."
—Sergey Petrov and Valeriy Rudnev, Izvestia (Moscow), 21 November 1992, p. 7, in "Leaders' Knowledge of CW Status Questioned," JPRS-TND-92-045, 7 December 1992, pp. 17-18.
May 1989
North Korea and Iran reportedly reach an agreement for the continued delivery of Scud-B missiles, and an extension of Iranian financing of North Korea's Scud development program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Developments," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 57.
Late 1989
Pilot production of the North Korean Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C) begins, and the first systems become operational.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 16; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 273.
October 1989
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezai travels to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung regarding final plans for the expansion of the Isfahan missile complex, and to address the development project for an extended-range Scud-B (Scud-C).
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Mednews, 21 December 1992, p. 5.
8 December 1989
South Korea and the USSR announce they will establish consular relations. The announcement is a blow to North Korea-Soviet bilateral relations.
—"Seoul and Moscow Set Up Partial Ties," New York Times, 9 December 1989, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
29 December 1989
Israeli military sources say that Syria is approaching North Korea for assistance in the development of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) after China, under US pressure, withdrew from a similar deal. The sources also indicate that Egypt and North Korea are engaged in a project to develop a missile based on the Soviet Scud missile; part of this project is being developed in Egypt. Retired Israeli Brigadier General Aharon Levran says that published reports indicate that North Korea is assisting Iran in the development of an indigenous SSM.
—Associated Press, "Syrian Bid for N. Korea Arms Aid Reported," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1989, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Syria Is Reported to Seek Help from N. Korea to Get Missiles," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 December 1989, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com >; Korea Times, 30 December 1989, p. 4, in "Missile Cooperation With North Korea Alleged," JPRS-TND-90-002, 17 January 1990, p. 12.
Late 1980s
According to North Korea's First Lieutenant Im Yŏng Sŏn, who defected on 11 August 1993, North Korea has completed construction of two underground long-range missile launch bases, one at Mount Komdŏk, Hwadae-gun, North Hamgyŏng Province and another at Okp'yŏng-nodongjagu, Munch'ŏn, Kangwŏn Province. Im also says that North Korea is currently building two missile bases at Chunggang, Chagang Province and at Wonsŏn, Kangwŏn Province. [Note: There are reports of the location being "Chunggang" and "Chunggangjin." The locations given are near Scud development facilities on North Korea's east coast. The sites are not related to North Korea's Scud regiment, which is reportedly located in the IV Corps area near Sariwŏn in the southwest of the country.]
—Kim Hŭi Ch'ŏl, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 August 1993, in "Says Long-Range Missile Bases Built," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; "2 N. Korean Missile Bases Allegedly Target Japan," Jiji Press, 24 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com >; Hankook Ilbo, "Puk Missile Kiji 2 Kot Wan'gong/Haengmugi Poyu...Yusashi Shiljŏnsayong Midŏ," 25 August 1993, p. 22, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Taehan Maeil (Seoul Shinmun), "'Pukhan, Yŏngbyŏnsŏ Chiha Haekshilhŏm'/Changgŏri Missile Kiji Sugot Kŏnsŏl," 25 August 1993, p. 22, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Hong Chin, "Guam Dŭng Migun'gonggyŏk Missile Kiji/Puk, 2 Kot Wan'gong 2 Kot Kŏnsŏlchung," Chosun Ilbo, 25 August 1993, p. 30, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
Late 1980s through 1990s
North Korea receives 9M111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) and 9M113 (AT-5 Spandral) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and the 9K34 Strela 3 (SA-14 Gremlin) and 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from Russia. Pyongyang is believed to have produced at least the 9M111 Fagot and the 9K34 Strela 3.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 32.
1989-1990
North Korea produces a small number of Nodong missile prototypes.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 22.
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